The macroeconomic effects of oil price and risk-premium shocks on Vietnam: Evidence from an over-identifying SVAR analysis by Pham, Thai-Binh & Sala, Hector
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The macroeconomic effects of oil price
and risk-premium shocks on Vietnam:
Evidence from an over-identifying SVAR
analysis
Pham, Thai-Binh and Sala, Hector
Department of Applied Economics, Autonomous University of
Barcelona, Spain, IZA, Bonn, Germany
12 May 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96873/
MPRA Paper No. 96873, posted 08 Nov 2019 17:07 UTC
 The macroeconomic effects of oil price and risk-premium shocks on Vietnam: 
Evidence from an over-identifying SVAR analysis 
 
Binh Thai Pham*,a, Hector Salaa, b 
a Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain 
b Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in Vietnam. It expands Kilian’s (2009) framework to 
simultaneously consider risk-premium shocks and comprehensively assess their consequences on international competitiveness 
and the State Bank management of the monetary policy. Methodologically, this implies dealing with an over-identified structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) model. Data wise, the analysis is performed on a unique dataset with variables defined at a monthly 
frequency running from 1998:01 to 2018:12. Demand-side, global-, and specific-oil price shocks determine inflation and 
international competitiveness, and play an essential role in explaining the long-run variations of several Vietnamese 
macroeconomic indicators (mainly the trade balance, three-month interest rates, and the inflation rate). Vietnam’s Dong pegging 
to the US Dollar results in a stronger impact of these shocks when real exchange rates and the rate of exports are modelled, than 
when real effective exchange rates and the trade balance are modelled. In the latter case, shock absorption is quicker given the 
multilateral trade context in which no single pegging holds. In association to the strong tie between Vietnam’s Dong and the U.S. 
dollar, we also uncover remarkable effects of risk-premium (or U.S. Federal Fund rate) shocks. Supply-side oil price shocks have 
little impact on inflation and international competitiveness but condition the monetary policy. Neglecting such influence in the 
past may have resulted in an excessively conservative monetary policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The strong upswing in crude oil price in the 2000s, and the subsequent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
in 2008 sparked an extensive research agenda on comprehending the causes and macroeconomic effects of 
oil price innovations.1 In a seminal publication, Kilian (2009) claimed that the transmission of oil price 
increases may be different than traditionally understood, due not only to their fundamental underlying 
shocks (i.e. fundamental supply versus demand shocks), but also to their interactions with specific 
investment activities and with the biggest oil consumption country – the U.S. economy. It was also stressed 
that temporary oil production disruptions owing to political tensions were less important than fundamental 
shocks in explaining oil price movements and their consequences. 
Taking an oil importer perspective, cost-push shocks due to oil and/or commodity price rises push up 
domestic prices of goods and services, thus triggering indirectly monetary policy measures to stabilise 
macroeconomic conditions. The transmission of the upsurge in oil prices into national main aggregates can 
be modelled using the traditional Cobb-Douglas production function (Bohi, 1991), which predicts that 
income will decline if energy (input) prices increase because of the higher cost-share of energy in the 
manufacturing process for the oil-importing economy. As a result, the macroeconomic performance will 
be worse in episodes of high oil prices (Hamilton, 1983, 2003), with negative impacts on living standards 
(Considine, 1988). For example, the rise of oil prices jeopardises GDP and increases the consumer price 
index (CPI) and unemployment in many OECD and emerging countries (Katircioglu et al., 2015; Choi et 
al., 2018). High oil prices may also weaken the country’s competitiveness in exporting raw materials and 
intermediates (Cavalcanti and Jalles, 2013; Korhonen and Ledyaeva, 2010; Lee and Chiu, 2011), but the 
effect is unlikely to be symmetric in case of low oil prices (An et al., 2014; Tatom, 1988). Moreover, the 
local currency exchange rate against the US dollar often depreciates when oil prices soar up (Lizardo and 
 
1 According to Scopus database 78.1% of oil- and commodity-related articles in the “economics”, “business” and “social 
sciences” literature were published in 2008 – 2018. Articles in English containing “oil price” or “oil shock” in the title or keywords, 
or “commodity price” in the title were searched for a period above 100 years, 1911-2018 (search conducted in April 2019). If the 
category “Energy” is included, this proportion remains constant (78.6%). 
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Mollick, 2010), affecting the terms of trade unfavourably (Kilian et al., 2009; Le and Chang, 2013; Rafiq 
et al., 2016; Salvatore and Winczewski, 1990). 
This paper studies the impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic dynamics of Vietnam over 
the two decades since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Vietnam’s economy is an appealing case of analysis 
for a twofold reason. First, it has been a ‘de-facto’ small open economy characterised by exporting crude 
oil since 1992. Second, it imports up to 70% of its domestic gasoline demand and most of cracked petroleum 
products despite the operation of its first and only oil refinery Dung Quat since 2009.2 Vietnam was actually 
a net oil exporter until 2009 as depicted in Figure 1 (panel B), but rapid growth alongside the steady 
expansion of exports and private vehicles have made the Vietnamese (VN henceforth) economy more oil-
dependent in the recent years. The situation may even worsen in the near future given the current VN oil 
production, reserve levels and exploration difficulties due to political tensions in Vietnam territorial waters. 
It should be noted, however, (i) that the VN state-owned enterprises have exerted control in all oil-related 
activities such as oil exploration, production, and distribution; and (ii) that the government budget 
systematically benefited both from exporting crude oil and importing petrol products by levying different 
taxes (for example, export/import tax, excise tax, consumption tax, among others). As a consequence, the 
transmission of world oil price changes on the prices of domestic goods and services is not so obvious due 
to a heavily regulated retail gasoline market. 
Figure 1 depicts some crucial macroeconomic information for Vietnam’s economy. Panels A and C 
disclose two negative relationships, one between the real oil price and the trade-balance-over-output (TBY), 
and another one between global real economic activity, the so-called Kilian index, and the real effective 
exchange rate (REER). Higher world demand may induce better trade competitiveness in Vietnam, as 
expressed by the lower REER, because it has long exported low added-value goods and agricultural 
products. Given this information, and the corresponding higher anticipated income, VN households may 
demand and import more sophisticated goods whose prices are also inflated, leading to a worsened trade 
 
2 The second oil refinery, Nghi Son, just began operation at the end of 2018, after several years delay. 
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balance due to the appreciation of Vietnam’s Dong (VND hereafter). In turn, real oil prices tend to rise in 
parallel to increases in world demand. This reinforces the deterioration of the TBY while simultaneously 
pushing up inflation. Conversely, it seems that changes in oil production do not exhibit significant 
correlations with VN macroeconomic aggregates.3 
 
Figure 1: Panel (A): Vietnamese trade-balance-over-output (TBY) and real oil price in 2001 – 2018; Panel (B): Vietnamese oil 
production versus oil consumption over 1980 – 2017; Panel C: Kilian’s (2009) global economic activity index versus VN real 
effective exchange rate; Panel D: VN inflation rate (year-on-year percentage) and 3-month interbank interest rate (percentage per 
annum). All series are on a monthly basis except for the VN oil production and consumption which are annual-based. 
Over the period 2008 – 2012, the VN economy experienced economic turmoil because of the GFC. Its 
year-on-year inflation rate (blue line in panel D, Figure 1) climbed to peaks of 28.6% and 23.7% in the 
third quarters of 2008 and 2009, respectively. Meanwhile, the trade balance deteriorated severely, by -10% 
of GDP on average. This notable macroeconomic instability triggered a battery of monetary measures that 
helped the rebalancing of the VN economy in 2013 – 2015. The State Bank of Vietnam (henceforth SBV) 
 
3 The correlation coefficients between changes in oil production and VN inflation rate, interest rate, real export growth, changes 
in real (effective) exchange rate, and trade-balance-over-output, respectively, are basically within the range [-0.1, 0.1].  
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raised the short-term interest rate (red line in panel D, Figure 1) to a record high of 19.7% in the first 
inflationary episode, 2008:01 – 2009:03. In the second one, instead, the SBV maintained a flat interest rate 
of 13.5% over sixteen months, 2010:12 – 2012:03, accompanying a steady decline in headline inflation to 
below 5% in 2014:04. Moreover, the sizable current account deficits over four years 2007 – 2011 stimulated 
the SBV to devalue the VND by 30% from 2008:04 to 2011:04. These policies actually brought about the 
recovery of the trade deficit in years later. 
These developments provide a first rough evidence that global demand shocks may be harmful for the 
VN economy and thus require an appropriate design of the monetary policy. Nevertheless, the existing 
macroeconomic literature on Vietnam’s economy is relatively scarce. Pham et al. (2019) put forward a 
small open economy real business cycle model showing that VN trade-balance-over-output has been 
sensitive to international shocks in the past three decades, 1986 – 2015. No explicit attention is paid, 
however, to the role of oil price shocks. Trang et al. (2017), using a VAR model with Cholesky 
decomposition, claim that oil price shocks inflate domestic prices while diminishing government budgets. 
Anwar and Nguyen (2018) consider oil prices in their two-block SVAR study of the transmission of oil 
price rises to the VN monetary policy between 1995 and 2010. Their results imply that “the monetary policy 
of Vietnam was quite sensitive and vulnerable to fluctuations in the world price of oil”. Still, none of these 
VAR analyses is able to disentangle structural oil supply and demand shocks in Kilian’s (2009) sense, as 
the research thereafter has done (for example, Ahmed and Wadud, 2011; Cuñado et al., 2015; Iwaisako and 
Nakata, 2017; Lorusso and Pieroni, 2018, among many others).4 Bhattacharya (2014) and Narayan (2013) 
are rare papers from international scholars considering Vietnam. Bhattacharya examined the movements of 
inflation in the short-run and connected the effectiveness of the monetary policy to changes in the nominal 
effective exchange rate, and to the credit expansion policy over the period 2004 – 2012. In turn, Narayan 
suggested that hikes in oil prices tend to depreciate the VND in the near future. 
 
4 In addition, their results may be liable to some inaccuracy from the linear extrapolation used to convert annual data to quarterly 
frequency observations in order to be able to expand backwards their sample period of analysis. 
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The drawback of these studies is that the triangle inflation-oil prices-monetary policy has been 
examined by components and not holistically. Hence, departing from the foregoing literature, we fill a void 
in the literature and comprehensively assess the pass-through of oil price fluctuations into the VN economy 
in two dimensions. First, we question how different oil price shocks affect the VN inflation rate, the real 
(effective) exchange rate, and foreign trade. Then, we analyse the responses to these shocks of VN monetary 
instruments, which comprise the three-month Interbank interest rate and the nominal exchange rate of VND 
against the U.S. Dollar. In all the analysis, we use monthly data covering the period 1998:01-2018:12. 
The methodological contribution is threefold. First, although we depart from Kilian’s (2009) 
framework of analysis, we work with an extended SVAR model with expanded foreign and domestic 
blocks. Second, we deal, as a consequence, with an over identified SVAR model whose predictive 
reliability requires accepting the over-identifying restrictions. Third, in using monthly data we are able to 
focus on a shorter sample period without falling short of degrees of freedom. This allows us to avoid any 
noise from a potential need of a low-to-high frequency data conversion. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of recent related literature on major 
Asian economies. Section 3 outlines the SVAR methodology, model specifications and data description. 
Sections 4 and 5 deal with the empirical results and variance analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Recent evidence on the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in major Asian countries 
A number of studies have focused on the macroeconomic effects of oil price and global demand shocks 
in several major Asian countries – namely, Japan, China, India, and other ASEAN economies. With the 
exception of Malaysia, these are all twenty-first century net oil importers. 
Although not unanimous, the evidence for Japan points to harmful macroeconomic effects of oil price 
shocks. For the shocks in the mid-1970s and 1979-1980, Lee et al. (2001) showed not only direct negative 
impacts, but also indirect effects caused by the subsequent tightening of the monetary policy that resulted 
in a higher money call rate. Zhang (2008) studied the non-linearity of these impacts and disclosed 
asymmetric effects on the Japanese macroeconomic performance with oil price increases causing larger 
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negative impacts on income growth than the positive ones from equivalent price cuts. Fukunaga et al. 
(2011) used Kilian’s (2009) framework to show negligible effects of oil price shocks on the Japanese 
economy, but Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2012) found evidence of the reverse for the early 1980s. 
Against the feeling that Japanese industrial production seems immune to oil price increases these days, the 
most recent evidence claims that global demand shocks and oil market-specific shocks not only are relevant 
but should be considered as chief stimulants of dynamism in the Japanese aggregates (Rahman and Zoundi, 
2018). Notably, Iwaisako and Nakata (2017) assert that positive non-fundamental oil price shocks 
supported Japanese exports in the 2000s. 
China, the second biggest economy and oil consumer in the world, endogenously affects the world oil 
price due to its enormous size and export expansion strategy (Faria et al., 2009). Kim et al. (2017) use 
different SVAR estimation techniques to find evidence of a price stabilisation policy of Chinese 
policymakers to counteract the inflationary effect of oil price shocks between 2001 and 2014. Nevertheless, 
the cumulative impact of China’s broad money supply is responsible for the strong recovery of oil prices 
during 2009, as noted by Ratti and Vespignani (2013). Taking a microeconomic-based approach, Zhao et 
al. (2016) propose a calibrated open economy DSGE model proving that oil supply shocks driven by non-
political events, aggregate shocks to the demand of industrial commodities, and oil-specific demand shocks 
have long-term impacts on China’s output and inflation fluctuations. Interestingly, Osorio and Unsal (2013) 
find that inflation in China has spillover effects on economies in the ASEAN community and India owing 
to their huge demand of commodity goods. 
Likewise, India – the second most populous country in the world – imports as much as 80% of its fuel 
demand, thus rendering its economy exposed to oil and commodity price shocks. Holtemöller and Mallick 
(2016) show that Indian consumer prices are highly sensitive to inflationary supply shocks (oil price, food 
price, and other cost-pushes), but question policy measures such as raising interest rates because of the 
harm that a monetary contraction would cause on output growth. It has also been observed that the oil price 
does not Granger cause the USD/INR exchange rate (Inumula and Solanki, 2017), implying that a policy 
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of stabilising and strengthening the Indian Rupee would contribute to brake the pass-through of global 
shocks on domestic inflation. 
Finally, there are several studies on the ASEAN-5 countries, namely, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. The battery co-integration tests by Kisswani (2016) reports a two-way 
relationship between real oil prices and real exchange rates in the long run, but Basnet and Upadhyaya 
(2015) claim that oil price shocks have only temporary effects on the ASEAN-5 markets. In particular, they 
show that inflation reflects oil price rises in all countries in the first two quarters after the shock, but restrict 
the positive impact of such rises on real output to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Sultonov (2017) 
studies the negative side of the oil price shocks from 2014 for the ASEAN-5 countries. He shows that crude 
oil price statistically affect exchange rates, and that the oil price volatility spills over from the crude oil 
market to the foreign exchange market. 
3. Empirical methodology and data description 
3.1. Methodology 
The small open economy SVAR model used in Kilian’s (2009) framework is typically set up in two 
blocks with a foreign (or exogeneous) block consisting of several variables accounting for oil price and/or 
other international shocks. For a small open economy, the second block includes domestically endogenous 
variables supposed to have negligible influence on their foreign block counterparts. Specifically, the two-
block SVAR has a form5 
[𝐴011𝐴021𝐴012𝐴022]⏟    𝐴0 [𝑦𝑡
𝑓𝑦𝑡𝑑]⏟𝑦𝑡 = ∑ ( 
 [𝐴𝑝11 𝐴𝑝12𝐴𝑝21 𝐴𝑝22]⏟      𝐴𝑝 [𝑦𝑡−𝑝
𝑓𝑦𝑡−𝑝𝑑 ]⏟  𝑦𝑡−𝑝 ) 
 𝒫𝑝=1 + [𝐵011𝐵012𝐵012𝐵022]⏟    𝐵0 [𝑢𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑑]⏟𝑢𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡𝑓  and 𝑦,𝑡𝑑  are vectors of 𝑘𝑓  foreign and 𝑘𝑑  domestic variables, respectively; 𝑝 = 1…𝒫  denotes 
lagged index of the time series; 𝐴0, 𝐴1..𝒫 and 𝐵0 are structural coefficient matrices that cannot be directly 
 
5 We have suppressed deterministic terms to simplify the exposition. 
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estimated; and 𝑢𝑡  is therefore the so-called vector of structural residuals assumed to be independently 
identically distributed such that 𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡′) = 𝐼𝐾≡𝑘𝑓+𝑘𝑑 . 
Pre-multiplying both sides of equation (1) by 𝐴0−1  (assuming 𝐴0  is invertible), one obtains the 
unrestricted reduced form as  
𝑦𝑡 = ∑𝐴0−1𝒫𝑝=1 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴0−1𝐵0𝑢𝑡 
which can be also rewritten in the more compact form 𝐵(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡, with the lag polynomial 𝐵(𝐿) = 𝐼 +𝐵1𝐿 +⋯+ 𝐵𝑝𝐿𝑝 and the vector of reduced residuals 𝜖𝑡 = 𝐴0−1𝐵0𝑢𝑡, so that 𝐸(𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡′) = 𝛺𝜖 is diagonal, i.e. 𝜖𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝛺𝜖). Furthermore, block exogeneity due to the small open economy assumption postulates that 
all elements of matrix 𝐵𝑝12 are restricted to zeros. This results in an unbalanced VAR model which behaves 
similarly to seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. 
Explicitly, the relationship between 𝜖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 in the sense of Amisano and Giannini (1997) is 𝐴0𝜖𝑡 = 𝐵0𝑢𝑡 
To recover either 𝐴0 or 𝐵0 or both from the consistent estimate of 𝜖𝑡, some restrictions need to be 
imposed on elements of 𝐴0 and/or 𝐵0 because of the symmetry of ?̂?𝜖. For example, if 𝑢𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝐼𝐾) and 
the diagonal elements of 𝐴0 are normalised to unity, then the just-identified identification requires a total 
of 𝐾2 + 𝐾(𝐾 − 1)/2 restrictions on both 𝐴0 and 𝐵0. 
We consider several SVAR specifications. The structure, common to the proposed models in the 
literature, is based on three standard variables in the exogenous block that emerged from Kilian’s study 
(2009) – oil production (Oilpd), a global economic activity index (Globix), and the real oil price (Oilpr). 
Restrictions on the 𝐴0 and/or 𝐵0’s elements are a fundamental matter in any SVAR analysis. Following 
Kilian (2009), the 𝐴011 block should have a recursive structure like 
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𝐴011 ≡ [𝑎11 𝑎12 𝑎13𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑎23𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33] ≡ [∗ 0 0∗ ∗ 0∗ ∗ ∗] 
where the asterisks (*) represent free parameters to be estimated. The ordering (oil production, global 
economic activity, real oil price) implies that contemporaneous impacts on the oil price may originate from 
oil supply disruption, oil consumption demand, or oil-specific market demand such as precautionary or 
non-fundamental shocks. Elements of the 𝐴021 block are free in the baseline setting, but we do impose 
additional zero-restrictions on the 𝐴021 matrix in the augmented models, as will become clear below. In 
regard to the domestic block, 𝐴022, the recursive structure is again applied to the small set of two variables, 
say the VN consumer price index (CPI) and the bilateral VND/USD real exchange rate (RER), so that the 
normalised matrices 𝐴0 and 𝐵0 of the baseline model are  
𝐴0𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ≡ [   
 1 0 0 0 0∗ 1 0 0 0∗ ∗ 1 0 0∗ ∗ ∗ 1 0∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 1]   
           𝐵0𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ≡ [   




Abstracting from the matrices structure just described, the baseline model by Kilian (2009) can be 
summarized as6 
Baseline model:  (DOilpd Globix LnOilpr⏞                𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 DLnCPI DLnRER⏞            𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ) 
 
3.2. Augmented models 
We take a step forward with respect to Kilian’s (2009) model and consider the possibility of risk-
premium shocks reflected in interest rate changes. We thus add the U.S. Federal Fund rate (Fedfunds) to 
 
6  Prefixes D, Ln, and DLn refer respectively to logarithm, first-difference, and log-difference operators, where the last is 𝐷𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡) = log(𝑦𝑡) − log (𝑦𝑡−1). 
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the foreign block such that the effects of world risk premium shocks can be taken into account in the 
analysis. 
In addition, the domestic block is augmented by taking into account real exports (REXP). This yields:  
Model I  (DOilpd Globix LnOilpr 𝐅𝐞𝐝𝐟𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐬⏞                          𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 DLnCPI DLnRER 𝐋𝐧𝐑𝐄𝐗𝐏⏞                  𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ) 
 
In connection to the real exchange rate, the addition of real exports allows us to model more precisely 
the impact of the oil price and risk-premium shocks on the external demand of VN goods and services. This 
can be further refined, however, by considering a wider approach to Vietnam’s international 
competitiveness. In this widen setting, the real exchange rate is substituted by the real effective exchange 
rate (REER) while real exports are replaced by the trade balance (TBY). This delivers: 
Model II  (DOilpd Globix LnOilpr Fedfunds⏞                        𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 DLnCPI 𝐃𝐋𝐧𝐑𝐄𝐄𝐑 𝐓𝐁𝐘⏞                  𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ) 
 
Finally, we are also interested in assessing how the SBV has dealt with the impact of oil price and 
risk-premium shocks in order to maintain inflation under control. This is certainly crucial for a small open 
economy such as VN. Consequently, we replace the real effective exchange rate and the trade balance by 
the interbank 3-month interest rate (Rate3M) and the nominal exchange rate Dong/$ (FX): 
Model III  (DOilpd Globix LnOilpr Fedfunds⏞                        𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 DLnCPI 𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞𝟑𝐌 𝐋𝐧𝐅𝐗⏞                𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ) 
In this way, the domestic block is made of the main variables of interest of a central bank so that its 
monetary policy response to oil price and risk-premium shocks can be properly assessed. 
The reasons for augmenting Kilian’s (2009) set up by recruiting different proxies for Vietnam’s 
external trade and monetary policy can be found in Pham et al. (2019). They showed that country risk 
premium shocks account for about one-fifth of Vietnam’s output growth variability, on the one hand; while, 
on the other, have a large explanatory power of the variations in the trade-balance-over-output ratio over 
the past two decades. 
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The first three columns of Table 1 summarise our model’s variable choices. In the three models I, II 
and III, we restrict (i) the oil supply shocks to have no contemporaneous effects on Vietnam’s domestic 
variables (i.e., in the month impact); and (ii) the risk-premium shocks to have no contemporaneous effects 
on Vietnam’s inflation either. This implies that our three SVAR specifications are over-identified and 
should then pass the Likelihood-Ratio test for over-identifying restrictions. This is indeed the case, as 
shown in the last two columns of Table 1. 
Model Foreign Block Domestic Block VAR(p) Largest Root Over-identification Test 
Baseline Kilian (2009) DLnCPI, DLnRER 6 0.97035 - 
A1 Kilian (2009), U.S. Fedfunds DLnCPI, DLnRER, DLnREXP 3 0. 99623 0.699 
A2 Kilian (2009), U.S. Fedfunds DLnCPI, DLnREER, TBY 3 0.95522 0.717 
B Kilian (2009), U.S. Fedfunds DLnCPI, Rate3M, LnFX 3 0.99140 0.634 
Notes: Kilian’s (2009) variables are oil production (OilProd), the global economic activity index (Globix), and the real oil price 
(Oilpr). Prefixes D, Ln, and DLn refer to logarithm, first-difference, and log-difference operators, with 𝐷𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑡) = log(𝑦𝑡) −log (𝑦𝑡−1); FX, RER, and REER are, respectively, the nominal VND/USD exchange rate, the bilateral VND/USD real exchange 
rate, and the real effective exchange rate; REXP denotes real exports; TBY represents trade-balance-over-output; Rate3M is the 
three-month Interbank interest rate; and CPI denotes the consumer price index. Zero-restrictions on 𝐴021 matrix of models I, II, 
and III are as [0 ∗ ∗ 00 ∗ ∗ ∗0 ∗ ∗ ∗]. Numbers in the last columns are p-values. 
Table 1: Model specifications 
According to Akaike’s information criteria and the rule-of-thumb in VAR order selection, we pick up 
the suitable order, VAR(p), of 3 for models I, II and III. In contrast, the baseline model is intentionally 
estimated with a six-month lag to entirely capture the effects of oil price shocks on the VN CPI and RER 
dynamics.7 The fifth column reports that all VAR models are stable since their largest inverse roots of the 
AR characteristic polynomial lie inside the unit circle. 
3.3. Data description 
It should be stressed that the constructed dataset is on a monthly basis. This is important because it 
allows our analysis to focus on a recent period, 1999-2018, without running out of degrees of freedom in 
the estimation. In addition, it is important to remark that no yearly-quarterly data interpolation has been 
needed, as it is often the case in studies on close emerging economies. We obtained the VN CPI, the nominal 
 
7 See Table A.1 in the appendix for further details. 
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exchange rate of the VND against the U.S. Dollar (FX), and export (EXP) data from the Vietnamese 
General Statistical Office (GSO) via Datastream. The interbank 3-month interest rate (Rate3M) was taken 
from the SBV. Real effective exchange rate (REER) running up to 2018:12 was extracted from Darvas 
(2012), since the IMF does not officially provide this series for Vietnam. Kilian’s studies (2009, 2019) 
supplied the corrected global economic activity index (Globix), which is a proxy for the world demand of 
goods. It should be noted that Hamilton (2018) criticises Kilian’s (2009) index for failing to account for 
global consumption demand. Nonetheless, Kilian (2019) adds a corrigendum justifying that the gap 
between the old and the new index is highly unlikely to bias any related studies. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) provided oil production (Oilprod) data in terms of 
a monthly average in thousands of barrels per day. For real oil price (Oilpr), we computed the average of 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent oil prices, also obtained from EIA, after adjusting by the U.S. 
consumer price index. All data series cover the timespan 1998:01 – 2018:12 except for the Rate3M series 
starting in 1999:01. Trading-balance-to-output (TBY) is calculated as 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡−𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑡 . Since 
output data for Vietnam in terms of US Dollar currency8 is only available at quarterly frequency from 
2001:01, the Chow-Lin interpolation method is used for the low-to-high frequency conversion. Figure A.1 
in the Appendix, shows the dynamics of the considered time series, whereas Tables 2 and A.2 in the 
Appendix report, respectively, descriptive statistics and the corresponding correlation matrix. 
Variables Oilprod Globix Oilpr DLnCPI DLnFX DLnRER REER Rate3M TBY DLnREXP 
Mean 73945 5.76 59.18 0.11 0.24 -0.08 112.97 7.73 -1.62 1.05 
Median 73931 -9.07 54.42 0.09 0.05 -0.10 106.77 7.37 -1.13 0.99 
Max 84225 188.00 132.97 0.79 8.77 6.94 148.36 19.69 4.06 45.80 
Min 64307 -163.00 13.98 -0.28 -0.54 -3.09 87.01 2.47 -13.37 -24.99 
Std.Dev 4908 71.35 27.49 0.15 0.87 1.01 17.54 3.14 2.72 8.63 
Obs 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 240 214 252 
Notes: Oilprod (thousand barrels / day), Oilpr (US$ / barrel), DLnCPI (% m-o-m), DLnFX (% m-o-m), DLnRER (% m-o-m), 
Rate3M (% pa), TBY (% GDP), DLnREXP (% m-o-m).  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, 1998:01 – 2018:12. 
 
8 Downloaded from CEIC data provider. 
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4. Empirical results and discussion 
In this section, we present and then discuss the estimated impulse-response functions (IRFs) of four 
models, from which the transmission of foreign shocks to the VN economy is quantitatively assessed over 
the full sample 1998 – 2012 period.9 These are Kilian’s (2009) baseline specification and its subsequent 
expanded versions – Models I, II, and III.  
We interpret a positive (negative) shock to any variable in the foreign block as causing increases 
(decreases) either in oil production, the global demand of goods, or in the level of speculation in the oil 
market. Similarly, a rise (fall) in the U.S. Federal Fund rate tightens (loosens) the monetary policy pushing 
up the cost of borrowing. Therefore, in the rest of this paper we use positive or negative shock 
interchangeably depending upon the context, but the IRFs are always computed and plotted as positive 
impacts. 
4.1. The baseline model 
Figure 2 shows the baseline IRFs, with one-standard-deviation error bands in red dotted lines. The 
first row of panel A shows that oil supply surprises only have a short-lived impact on both domestic 
endogenous variables (CPI, RER), as their responses vanish within two quarters. On the contrary, oil 
demand shocks induced by global economic activity or speculation/innovation induce highly persistent 
responses in the VN inflation and real exchange rates. Specifically, the responses of the inflation rate to oil 
demand and oil-specific demand shocks reach their peaks in two and eight months, respectively, and then 
asynchronously revert to equilibrium. However, the recovery of the inflation rate under non-fundamental 
oil price shocks is much faster than under shocks influenced by global demand, with the former clearly 
dying down within a one-year horizon. 
 
9  Beyond the direct estimation of equation (1), we have also estimated the system including dummy variables that control 
for the possible inflection point experienced by the VN economy in 2009, when it became a net oil importer. All the reported 
results in this paper hold in the presence of these dummy variables, which take value 1 in 2009-2018 and zero otherwise. 
We interpret this robustness as evidence that 2009 did not cause a structural break in the economic relationships under 
scrutiny. These additional results are available upon request. 
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From the second row of panel B, we observe that one standard deviation of an oil demand shock (about 
18 index points) raises the VN CPI by an annualised percentage of 1.9%, 3.6%, and 4.8% over one-, two- 
and three-year horizons, respectively. Correspondingly, the RER falls greatly, by 6.5, 13.1%, and 17.4% 
per annum in the same three horizons, respectively, leading to a strong appreciation of the VND against the 
U.S. Dollar. 
Hence, Kilian’s (2009) baseline model reveals that, even though supply-side shocks are innocuous, 
the VN CPI and RER are fairly responsive to both types of oil demand shock. 
 
Figure 2: The baseline model (DOilpd, Globix, LnOilpr, DLnCPI, DLnRER). Panel A: Recursive impulse - response functions 
(IRFs) of VN CPI and RER to one standard deviation structural shocks, defined as oil supply, oil demand, and oil market-specific 
demand; Panel B: accumulated IRFs of the corresponding ones in panel A. The red dotted lines are the 68% error bands. 
 
4.2. Models I and II 
The estimated IRFs for models I and II yield particular insights into the dynamics of VN external trade 
variables. They reveal, first of all, that VN export and trade balances were immune to any surprising change 
in global oil production. Although, this tends to confirm the innocuous effects of supply-side oil price 
shocks, Figure 3 clarifies that oil production increases have marginally significant and short-lived impacts 
on the time-paths of VN (real) effective exchange rates and domestic prices. 
16 
The IRFs of RER and REER are quite similar under the effects of oil supply disruptions, but they 
behave in the opposite way when hit by oil demand shocks. To be precise, a positive global demand oil 
shock raises the VN REER significantly and persistently for almost a year after the impact. In contrast, an 
oil-specific demand shock initially decreases REER growth rate by about 0.3 percent per month, but rapidly 
returns to its equilibrium before climbing to a positive peak of 0.15% in the fourth month. This indicates 
that the VN economy starts losing its relative competitive advantage in just one quarter after a speculative 
oil price shock hits the economy. Conversely, the resulting strengthened values of the VND result in 
cheaper foreign goods for the VN households in a year or more and compromise the trade balance. On this 
account, note that the responses of TBY depicted in the third row of Figure 3 – Panel B show that oil price 
increases actually impair the VN trade balance in the short-to-medium run, and of course the current 
account, even though exports also improve.  
 
Figure 3: The IRFs of model I (DOilpd, Globix, LnOilpr, Fedfunds, DLnCPI, DLnRER, LnREXP). The dotted lines are the 68% 
error bands. 
Equally important, Kilian’s (2009) expanded models uncover that the U.S. Federal Fund rate has 
remarkable effects on the VN economy because of the strong tie between the two currencies, as pointed out 
by Anwar and Nguyen (2018). The fourth column of Figure 3 – Panel A shows that the VN inflation rate 
significantly improves (negative adjustment) in two quarters or more, if there is a hike in the U.S. policy 
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rate. However, it slowly recovers subsequently and then reverts to the zero-line in the mid-term. Note that 
the response of inflation to the Federal Funds rate in model I is stronger than its counterpart in model II. In 
the first case, we evaluate the reaction of the RER, which is highly conditioned by VND pegging to the US 
dollar.10 In the second case (Figure 3 – Panel B), in contrast, the response is much less persistent in 
consistence to the multilateral setting captured by the REER. The REER reflects an enlarged system of 
trade relationships in which adjustments take place quicker than in the bilateral setting depicted by Model 
I. 
 
Figure 3 (continue): The IRFs of model II (DOilpd, Globix, LnOilpr, Fedfunds, DLnCPI, DLnREER, TBY). The dotted lines are 
the 68% error bands. 
By the same token, the VN trade balance significantly positively reacts to an increase in the exogenous 
risk premium in five months after the initial impact, since that type of shock depreciates the VND in the 
following six months (see the last column of Figure 3 – Panel A), after reaching the peak response of 0.15% 
at the second month and afterwards diminishing to the negative side but the latter is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
10 Note that 𝑅𝐸𝑅 = 𝐹𝑋 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑓𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑑. This explains the systematic inverse responses of the RER and domestic inflation.  
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4.3. Model III 
Figure 4 presents the adjustments of Vietnam’s monetary policy – domestic interest rates and nominal 
VND/USD exchange rates –, in response to oil prices and international risk premium innovations. Global 
demand shocks indirectly provoke the rises in VN interest rates, with a lag of two months in response to 
the consumption price rally. The peak interest rate response occurs in the sixteenth month, nearly ten 
months after the peak of changes in the inflation rate, implying that the effects of oil demand shocks on the 
VN economy are prolonged. When the Vietnam’s economy is hit by an 8.3% increase in crude oil prices, 
which is estimated to be one standard deviation of oil market-specific demand shock, the short-term interest 
rate climbs dramatically to a peak of 0.5% at four months after the response of inflation rate attains its 
largest magnitude in the second period. Likewise, the nominal VND/USD exchange rate only commences 
to depreciate significantly after a five-month lag after an oil-specific demand shock. This reflects the strong 
connection between the nominal exchange rate and the short-term interest rate. 
The detachment between the responses of inflation, on one side, and domestic interest rates and 
nominal VND/USD exchange rates, on the other, during the first two months after a risk-premium shock, 
can be interpreted as a manifestation of the “price puzzle” (see Castelnuovo and Surico, 2006). Our reading 
of these results is that the VN authorities have implemented the monetary policy in a cautious fashion. In 
particular, the interest rate policy seems to have been too passive regarding international demand shocks 
and/or not strong enough to counteract the rapid inflation rate growth resulting from such innovations. This 
interpretation is consistent with Bhattacharya’s (2014) finding of persistently larger rates of inflation in 
Vietnam than in its neighbouring emerging economies. 
Supporting this argument, Figure A.3 adds complementary information showing model’s III IRFs of 
the three variables in the domestic block in response to their own innovations. The autonomous responses 
of the inflation rate vanish in two quarters, in clear contrast to the interest rate response to this same shock, 
which steadily rises to reach its peak over the same six-month period and only converges back to zero over 
a fifteen-month period. Contrariwise, the inflation rate responds weakly to a rise in the interest rate, which 
is in fact consistent with the findings of Bhattacharya (2014). In the case of an exchange rate shock, the 
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interest rate tends to react strongly in the first half-year (note that its initial response of 0.1% equates 90% 
of the peak), while the inflation rate only responds significantly in three consecutive months after the initial 
impact. Finally, the nominal VND/USD exchange rate adjusts upwards in the aftermath of a positive shock 
to either the inflation or the interest rate, but soon stabilises over the short- to medium-term. 
 
Figure 4: The IRFs of model III (DOilpd, Globix, LnOilpr, Fedfunds, DLnCPI, Rate3M, LnFX). Red dotted lines are the 68% 
error bands. 
5. Variance analysis 
5.1. Forecasting variance decomposition 
The above analysis tells us how VN macroeconomic indicators behave in response to foreign surprises 
as well as their own innovations, but it cannot explain how much of their variation is explained by those 
shocks for either forecasting or historical analysis. Table 3 summarises the variance contribution of each 
structural shock to each domestic endogenous variable across Models I, II and III (we only show the first 
twenty-four months, as they are fairly stable afterward). Note that, for the inflation rate, we average the 
contributions of four foreign shocks because their model-specific values are remarkably similar, and it is 
not worth presenting them separately.  Figure A.4 in the Appendix depicts these variance shares for each 
endogenous series in detail. 
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At the first six-month horizon, we find that domestic variables are predominantly affected by their 
own shocks. It is worth highlighting, however, that among the foreign block shocks, precautionary oil 
demand shocks have the strongest explanatory power, accounting for around one-fifth of the variation in 
the VN inflation rate and three-month interest rate. 
In the middle run and beyond, from 12 to 24 months, autonomous shocks explain about 50% of the 
fluctuations in the trade balance and inflation rate, 26% of the fluctuations in the three-month interest rate, 
and between 66% and 80% of the fluctuations in the other domestic variables. Compared to other structural 
shocks, global demand shocks seem to be the most important macroeconomic drivers, as they account for 
about one-third of the fluctuation in TBY, one-fifth in inflation, one quarter in interest rates, and roughly 
one-tenth in exports and the RER. However, they make only a negligible contribution to nominal exchange 
rates and the REER. In sharp contrast, oil production disruption has an extremely low explanatory power 
of these variances. 
Additionally, oil market-specific shocks are highly likely to play a crucial role in explaining the long-
run variance in interest and inflation rates. To be precise, its contribution to interest rates approximately 
equals the size of the own shock (close to one-fourth), while its contribution to inflation rates is around 
17%. The results also show that an oil-specific shock accounts for 8%, 10%, and 8% of the long-run 
variance of the nominal exchange rate, exports, and REER, respectively. Regarding the risk premium shock 
induced by the U.S. monetary policy, we find that, after 24 months, it has only a small impact on all 
domestic variables, explaining between 2.5% and 7.3% of their long-run volatilities. 
Summing up, our findings indicate that apart from the prime power of own shocks in the short run, 
both types of oil demand shock play an essential role in explaining the long-run variations of several VN 
macroeconomic indicators. Oil demand shocks most particularly affect the trade balance, whereas the three-
month interest rate is strongly influenced by oil-specific demand innovations. In addition, both types of 
shock are equally important for the inflation rate. Lastly, it is shown that inflation moderately affects 






















































DLnCPI 1 0.09 0.30 7.46 0.00 92.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1.29 4.39 19.82 4.01 61.80 1.20 1.70 0.68 10.41 3.21 8.90 
12 1.14 12.10 18.69 5.09 53.80 1.96 1.47 0.60 12.79 2.98 7.78 
18 1.09 16.65 17.80 5.01 50.70 1.98 1.41 0.57 12.13 2.80 7.36 
24 1.09 18.47 17.39 5.14 49.38 1.94 1.38 0.56 11.85 2.71 7.19 
Rate3M 1 0.00 0.42 2.56 1.56 1.27 94.18 0.00 
    
6 0.29 3.73 18.36 0.76 18.87 56.32 1.68 
    
12 0.22 9.74 26.78 3.73 22.13 36.09 1.31 
    
18 0.20 16.77 26.82 6.26 19.34 29.49 1.11 
    
24 0.18 21.81 25.67 6.82 17.57 26.78 1.17 
    
LnFX 1 0.01 0.73 0.87 0.00 3.03 1.26 94.10 
    
6 0.33 0.62 1.54 0.22 2.73 6.80 87.75 
    
12 0.43 0.44 3.82 1.43 4.65 7.22 82.02 
    
18 0.62 0.38 5.91 4.18 5.25 6.74 76.93 
    
24 0.81 0.29 7.96 7.32 5.24 6.21 72.17 
    






























TBY 1 0.01 0.06 0.52 1.05 2.07 




6 0.34 12.86 4.11 5.59 2.70 




12 0.38 27.92 4.10 4.70 2.73 




 18 0.44 32.46 3.85 4.69 2.57 




24 0.48 33.26 3.96 5.20 2.51 


































DLnREER 1 0.07 0.04 3.39 1.62 8.84 




6 2.66 0.18 5.01 2.61 8.69 




12 3.03 0.48 7.00 2.56 8.50 




18 3.00 0.95 7.71 2.57 8.39 




24 2.99 1.27 8.00 2.58 8.33 




Note: variance decomposition of DLnCPI w.r.t foreign shocks is averaged over models I, II, and III. The top row represents 
structural shocks, while each row in the first column is the decomposed variable. 
 
Table 3: Variance decomposition of models I, II, and III. 
 
5.2. Historical variance decomposition 
The preceding subsection answered the question of the variance contribution in a forecasting context. 
We now turn to explore and contrast how these shocks explain the dynamics of Vietnam’s inflation, interest 
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rates and trade balance in the following selected periods of interest: the two inflationary episodes of 2007:06 
– 2009:12 and 2010:01 – 2012:06, and the years of deteriorated trade-balance-over-output in 2007:01 – 
2011:12. Figures 5, 6 and 7 present the contributions of the structural oil price and risk-premium shocks to 
their trajectories (oil supply shocks are omitted due to their extremely limited impacts on the domestic 
variables, as also found in Table 3). The bars represent actual data, while the black solid lines depict the 
benchmark projection implied by the model in the absence of shocks. In turn, the different dashed lines 
correspond to the sum of two components: the benchmark projection and the stochastic accumulation 
accruing from each respective structural shock. 
 
Figure 5: Historical variance decomposition of VN inflation rate. 
Figure 5 shows that all three types of foreign shocks produced strong impacts on the VN inflation rate 
during the first inflationary episode, 2007:06 – 2008:06, but only the global demand oil and oil-specific 
demand shocks kept their strong influence in 2010:06 – 2011:09. The fall in inflation between 2008:09 and 
2009:05 is mostly explained by oil-specific demand and autonomous inflation shocks. Given, in addition, 
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the low impact of nominal interest rates (Panels B and D), one is bound to conclude that Vietnam’s 
monetary policy was largely inefficient in the first inflationary episode, and it was thanks to domestic 
aggregate demand and oil price declines due to non-fundamental innovations that inflation pulled down 
subsequently. In sharp contrast, shocks to oil-specific demand were the only foreign factor that accelerated 
inflation in the second inflationary period. This may be explained by the socio-economic and political 
tensions around the world that caused the rise in precautionary oil demand between 2011 and 2014 (Lorusso 
and Pieroni, 2018). 
Panel D of Figure 5 also shows that VN aggregate demand was a major force driving inflation in 2010 
– 2011 for the reasons mentioned in Bhattacharya (2014), namely, movements in nominal effective 
exchange rates, real output growth, and credit expansion. Actually, in mid-2011 the nominal VND/USD 
exchange rate had a considerable impact on VN consumer prices, but it is clear that the impact was short-
lived. 
Turning to interest rate dynamics, Figure 6 shows that the benchmark projections (black lines) exhibit 
an opposite influence on the movements of interest rates in the past two periods. A slight upward trend 
between 2007 and 2009, while a downward line is observed in the period 2010 – 2012. Similarly to Figure 
5, we find that oil-specific demand and inflation shocks strongly affected interest rates, even though the 
latter were capped at 13.5% for sixteen months between 2010:12 and 2012:03. Panel D suggests that 
autonomous interest rate shocks considerably reduced the combined effects of oil-specific, inflation, and 
nominal exchange shocks that would have raised the interest rate to above 14% had it not been capped. 
Figure 7 shows the base projection from 2007:01 to 2011:12, which is remarkably close to the long-
run trade-balance deficit of -2.5% of GDP, as highlighted by Pham et al. (2019). Panel A shows that the 
U.S. monetary policy implemented in the aftermath of the GFC helped improve the VN trade balance, but 
oil price shock due to global demand worsened it notably in most of the assessed months. Finally, we 
observe that the trade balance was driven essentially by shocks per se, while the rest of domestic shocks 
had limited impacts on it. 
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Figure 6: Historical variance decomposition of the VN 3-month interbank interest rate. 
 
 
Figure 7: Historical variance decomposition of trade-balance-over-output. 
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6. Conclusions  
Vietnam is known to be a small open country in the process of completing its transition to a free-
market economy. It is less known, however, that it was a net exporter of crude oil until 2009, at the same 
time that it had to import up to 70% of the gasoline consumed domestically and most cracked petroleum 
products. In spite of the long-time planned and expected oil refineries, only Dung Quat started to be in 
operation in 2009 and could not counterbalance the growing need of oil imports. Given this twofold 
exposition (to trade in general, and to oil prices in particular), Vietnam’s economic prospects crucially 
depend on the ability to manage the consequences of potential global shocks. This paper provided a step 
forward in the understanding of the mechanisms through which such shocks may condition Vietnam’s 
economic performance. 
To conduct the analysis, we followed Kilian’s (2009) framework and examined the macroeconomic 
consequences of different oil price shocks: (1) oil supply shocks; (ii) oil demand shocks reflecting changes 
in the level of global economic activity (also called global demand oil shocks); and (3) oil-specific demand 
shocks, which are also referred to as precautionary, speculative or non-fundamental demand shocks. 
Under Kilian’s (2009) baseline model, our analysis yielded a first important insight for Vietnam’s 
economy, namely that its CPI and RER are fairly responsive to both types of oil demand shocks (and not 
to the supply-side shock). In particular, the recovery of inflation to oil-specific demand shocks, whose 
impact clearly dyes down within one-year, is much faster than to global demand oil shocks. The persistence 
of the latter implies that one standard deviation of such shock raises VN CPI by 3.6% per annum and 
reduces the RER by 13.1% per annum in the same 24-month horizon. This leads to a strong appreciation 
of the VND against the U.S. Dollar. A first important result is, therefore, the harm of global demand oil 
price shocks in terms of inflation and international price-competitiveness. 
Models I and II allow a deeper evaluation on the way oil price and risk-premium shocks affect 
competitiveness in Vietnam. First, the little influence from oil supply disruptions is confirmed both from 
the IRFs of the RER and the REER, which display similar responses. Second, the harm in terms of 
international price-competitiveness is also confirmed when oil price shocks arise either from global demand 
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or speculative activities. Impulses in both cases strengthen the VND during at least a year, thereby leading 
to cheaper foreign goods for VN households. 
Amid this general appraisal, Kilian’s (2009) expanded setting allows the identification of idiosyncratic 
responses of RER and REER when the economy is hit by global demand oil price shocks. On the one hand, 
the RER and the REER react in opposite ways to such noises. On the other hand, the impact on the REER 
varies depending on the nature of the demand-side perturbation. A global demand oil price shock 
significantly raises VN’s REER after eleven months, causing a loss in trade competitiveness (exports 
become more expensive, imports become cheaper, or both since Vietnam is at the same time an oil exporter 
and an oil importing economy). In contrast, an oil-specific demand shock decreases REER growth rate by 
about 0.3 percent per month initially and quickly overshoots to reach a peak of 0.15% in the fourth month. 
This indicates that in case of an oil-specific shock the VN economy may start losing its relative competitive 
advantage in one quarter. Of course, REER responses were examined together with TBY’s ones and we 
saw that oil price increases actually impair Vietnam’s trade balance, and of course, the current account. 
Turning to risk-premium shocks, we uncovered remarkable effects of the U.S. Federal Fund rate 
because of the strong tie between the two respective currencies. In model I with the RER, we disclosed the 
strong impact of risk-premium shocks on Vietnam’s inflation rate due to VND pegging to the US dollar. In 
contrast, in the multilateral setting brought by the REER, we found short-lived price responses. This is the 
outcome of international competition beyond the pegging of VND and the US dollar. Inflation responds 
more quickly to risk-premium shocks because in the multilateral trade context there is more penetration of 
imported goods and services in the worse currency scenario brought by such shocks. For the same reason, 
Vietnam’s trade balance reacts positively to an increase in the exogenous risk premium, since that type of 
shock depreciates the VND in the following ten months so that exports are enhanced, and imports 
restrained. 
Model 3 allowed us to assess how reactive the monetary policy is to oil price and risk-premium shocks. 
It is in this case that we found significant impacts of oil supply demand shocks on the 3-month interest rate 
and the nominal VND/USD exchange rates during the first two months after the shock. The possibility of 
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quickly increasing oil imports may be the reason why this response, although significant, tends to be short-
lived. 
We also found that the 3-month interest rate (and/or short-term interest rates) has been greatly sensitive 
to both types of oil demand shocks and to changes in international financial risk. 
Given the lack of inflation sensitivity to supply-side oil price shocks delivered by Kilian’s (2009) 
baseline model, the significant monetary policy response to these shocks in the first two months after the 
shock was a new result requiring some interpretation. Especially in a context in which inflation on one side, 
and the monetary policy response on the other, showed a detachment (moving, respectively, upwards and 
downwards) consistent with the so-called “price puzzle” (Castelnuovo and Surico, 2006). This may be 
revealing of a conservative implementation of the monetary policy in Vietnam in recent decades, which 
would be consistent with Bhattacharya’s (2014) assessment of Vietnam’s persistently higher inflation vis-
à-vis other Asian emerging economies. We therefore conclude that Vietnam’s authorities were quite 
conservative in their reaction to international demand shocks and failed to counteract the inflationary 
pressures brought from that shocks. In this context, Bhattacharya’s (2014) call for a forward-looking 
monetary policy in Vietnam is also endorsed by our analysis. 
As our variance decomposition analysis showed, this is likely to have had adverse effects on 
competitiveness on account of the essential role played by both types of demand-side oil price shocks in 
the long-run variations of several VN macroeconomic indicators, most particularly on the trade balance. 
In a context in which inflationary periods are mainly driven by the effects of oil price shocks, we have 
confirmed that it is likely that Vietnam’s monetary policy was to some extent inefficient in the first 
inflationary period (2007-2009). However, in the second period (2010-2012) domestic aggregate demand 
and oil price declines due to non-fundamental innovations pulled down Vietnam’s inflation rate and 
counterbalanced the impact of global demand oil price shocks for precautionary reasons. As shown by 
Lorusso and Pieroni (2018), a set of socio-economic and political tensions around the world from 2011 to 
2014 resulted in a rising precautionary demand for oil. This was the only foreign driver of inflation in 
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Vietnam in those years, but it is a key example of how global shocks may affect domestic macroeconomic 
performance thereby asking for an appropriate policy response. 
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Model  Largest root p FPE AIC SC HQ 
Baseline 0.97035 0 10.40853 16.53201 16.60204 16.56019 
  
1 0.012608 9.815951   10.23612*   9.985019* 
  
2 0.011602 9.732562 10.50287 10.04252 
  
3   0.011231*   9.699457* 10.81991 10.1503 
Model I 0.99623 0 7.460511 21.87476 21.9728 21.91421 
  
1 2.37E-06 6.912553 7.69687 7.228146 
  
2 9.20E-07 5.96498   7.435575*   6.556717* 
  
3   8.65e-07*   5.901157* 8.05803 6.769038 
Model II 0.95522 0 72.95096 24.15493 24.26801 24.20066 
  
1 0.000505 12.27318   13.17785* 12.63906 
  
2   0.000261*   11.61174* 13.30799   12.29776* 
  
3 0.000301 11.75056 14.23839 12.75672 
Model III 0.99140 0 0.825113 19.6729 19.7769 19.71484 
  
1 8.91E-09 1.329123   2.161094* 1.664648 
  
2   4.65e-09*   0.678190* 2.238136   1.307300* 
  
3 5.09E-09 0.765657 3.053577 1.688352 
 
Figure A.1: VAR order selection. 
          
          Correlation         
Probability DLnOilpd  LnOilpr  Globix  DLnCPI  Rate3m  DLnRER  DLnREER  DLnREXP  TBY 
DLnOilpd  1.000000         
 -----          
          
LnOilpr  0.024619 1.000000        
 0.7203 -----         
          
Globix  0.055407 0.266420 1.000000       
 0.4200 0.0001 -----        
          
DLnCPI  0.004056 0.428292 0.521264 1.000000      
 0.9530 0.0000 0.0000 -----       
          
Rate3M  -0.073691 0.434138 0.340182 0.424267 1.000000     
 0.2832 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
          
DLnRER  -0.063261 -0.210418 -0.235422 -0.438477 -0.165433 1.000000    
 0.3571 0.0020 0.0005 0.0000 0.0154 -----     
          
DLnREER  0.069859 0.210527 0.081512 0.242466 0.139802 -0.353575 1.000000   
 0.3091 0.0020 0.2351 0.0003 0.0410 0.0000 -----    
          
DLnREXP  0.055455 0.043316 0.064389 0.073961 -0.007027 0.085658 0.003776 1.000000  
 0.4196 0.5285 0.3486 0.2814 0.9186 0.2120 0.9562 -----   
          
TBY  -0.043473 -0.282740 -0.648303 -0.619260 -0.394005 0.258300 -0.002675 0.034144 1.000000 
 0.5270 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.9690 0.6194 ----- 
Table A.2: Correlation matrix (p-values are below the correlation coefficients). 
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Figure A.3: Impulse - response functions w.r.t domestic structural shocks. 
  
 
Figure A.3 (continue): Impulse - response functions w.r.t domestic structural shocks. 
 









Figure A.4 (continue) 
